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Torts: Anderson v. Eichner - Although Faculty
Physicians, Resident Physicians, and Interns Face Private
Tort Liability for Medical Malpractice, the State Is Immune

-Introduction
As it existed at common law, the doctrine of sovereign immunity shielded a
governmental entity from liability for the tortious acts of its employees. In 1907,
Oklahoma adopted the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The doctrine was judicially
modified several times until the Oklahoma legislature codified its sovereign
immunity policies in 1984 through the adoption of the Governmental Tort Claims
Act (GTCA).' The GTCA affords immunity to the state, its political subdivisions,
2
and to their employees for torts committed within the scope of employment.
3
The recent Oklahoma Supreme Court case, Anderson v. Eichner, examined the
GTCA in relation to faculty physicians, resident physicians, and interns. The court
held that these physicians are not acting within the scope of their employment while
practicing medicine or providing treatment to patients Thus, if these physicians
commit a tortious act while practicing medicine, the state is immune from liability,
and the physicians are subject to private tort liability However, while engaged in
teaching activities or while participating in a graduate medical program, these
physicians are immune from liability, and the state is liable for their actions."
Most states have abrogated or at least modified the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity. However, several jurisdictions have upheld immunity for
faculty physicians, resident physicians, and interns. In contrast to Oklahoma's
Governmental Tort Claims Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act provides immunity for
physicians acting within the scope of their employment, even though the physician
was practicing medicine or engaged in the treatment of patients.
Several implications result from the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in
Anderson. First, plaintiffs may not be adequately compensated because a resident
7
physician's and intern's tort liability is limited to $100,000 under the GTCA. Thus,
a plaintiff may attempt to find a deeper pocket to bear the liability. Second, in
Oklahoma, state hospitals are immune from liability for the tortious acts of their
1. See Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, ch. 203, 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws 431 (codified as
amended at 51 OKLA. STAT. §§ 151-172 (1991 & Supp. 1995)).
2. See 51 OKLA. STAT. § 152.1(A) (1991).
3. 890 P.2d 1329 (Okla. 1994).
4. See id. at 1341.

5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See 51 OKLA. STAT. § 154(D) (Supp. 1995).
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faculty physicians, resident physicians, and interns engaged in the practice of
medicine.' Thus, a faculty physician remains as the only vicarious defendant when
a plaintiff sues a resident physician or intern, and no statutory limit to recovery
exists under the GTCA to limit his potential liability. Therefore, the faculty
physician's insurer is placed in more jeopardy than a private physician's. Third,
because resident physicians and interns engaged in the practice of medicine face tort
liability, an appropriate standard of care should be developed for resident physicians
because they are physicians in training. Resident physicians should not be held to
the same standard of care as a licensed physician. Holding resident physicians to
the same standard of care as a licensed physician would be unfair and financially
burdensome.
Part I of this note will discuss the historical development of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in American common law as well as the development of the
doctrine in Oklahoma law. Part II focuses on the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
decision in Anderson. Part M will examine the Federal Tort Claims Act's treatment
of federally employed physicians. Part IV will discuss the implications of the
Anderson case. Finally, Part V will analyze Anderson in light of a subsequent
Oklahoma Supreme Court opinion in Strubhartv. Perry Memorial Hospital Trust
Authority
L Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
A. HistoricalDevelopment in English and American Common Law
The doctrine of sovereign immunity shields a governmental entity from the
tortious acts of its employees."0 The United States borrowed its sovereign
immunity principles from English common law." English tradition stated that "the
King could do no wrong."'" In other words, the King was incapable of wrongdoing. 3 This legal muxim represented the idea that no court in England could obtain
jurisdiction over the King unless he consented to the action. 4 This idea was firmly
rooted in English common law when the colonies gained their independence from
England. 5
The newly independent United States modified English sovereign immunity
principles and determined that the government is "immune from any suit to which
it has 'not [yet] consented."' 6 Subsequently, the doctrine was applied to state

8. See Anderson, 1390 P.2d at 1337.
9. 903 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1995).
10. See Bruce G. Hart, Jr., Medical Malpractice Protection Under the Federal Tort Claims Act:
Protecting Both Physicians and Claimants, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1107 (1990).
11. See George J. Meyer, Sovereign Immunityfor Tort Actions in Oklahoma: The Governmental Tort
Claims Act, 20 TULSA L.J. 561, 561 (1985).
12. Id. at 562.
13. See generally Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 3-5 (1924).
14. See id. at 4.
15. See Hart, supra note 10, at 1107 n.1.

16. Id.; see also Fetes v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
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governments. The foundation for the doctrine as illustrated by Justice Holmes is
that "there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends."17 That is, the sovereign creates legal rights but is not required
to abide by those rights. 8
B. Sovereign Immunity in Oklahoma
The doctrine of sovereign immunity first appeared in Oklahoma law in 1907 in
James v. Trustees of Wellston Township. 9 In James, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
held that, absent a specific statute imposing liability, the township and the state are
immune from liability? Oklahoma employed the governmental-proprietaryfunction inquiry in assessing tort liability as to all levels of government."' Under
the governmental-proprietary-function inquiry, a governmental entity retained
sovereign immunity for tortious conduct performed in its governmental capacity;
however, the governmental entity was subject to tort liability for conduct performed
in its proprietary capacity.?
Until the Oklahoma Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Vanderpool v. State,' the
state enjoyed almost complete immunity from tort liability with few exceptions.?
In light of the expanded role of government in modem society, the Vanderpool
court modified the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.' The Vanderpool
court declared that the governmental-proprietary-function inquiry should no longer
be determinative in assessing tort liability.'
Instead, the Vanderpool court announced a new standard for determining the
state's liability in tort actions. The court held that a state or local governmental
entity is liable for the tortious acts of that entity's employees acting within the scope
of employment, in the same manner as a private individual z The Vanderpool
court noted that its decision did not impact "any act of the Legislature in the area
of governmental immunity whether presently in effect or hereafter passed."' In

17. Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
18. See James P. Cooney III & Robert J.Eidnier, Sovereign Immunityfor State HospitalEmployees
After James v. Jane, 67 VA. L. REV. 393, 397 (1981).
19. 90 P. 100 (Okla. 1907).
20. See id. at 106.
21. See Vanderpool v. State, 672 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Okla. 1983).
22. See Meyer, supranote 11, at 568; see also Hershel v. University Hosp. Found., 610 P.2d 237
(Okla. 1980); Terry v. Edgin, 598 P.2d 228 (Okla. 1979); Oklahoma City v. Hill, 50 P. 242 (Okla. 1897).
23. 672 P.2d 1153 (Okla. 1983).
24. See id. at 1153; see also Meyer, supra note 11, at 569. The exceptions included:
1. the tortious activity in which the state was involved was being conducted in a
proprietary, as opposed to governmental capacity; or 2. the state had purchased liability
insurance, in which case implied consent to waive its immunity was assumed, up to the
amount of the policy; or 3. the plaintiff had obtained a 'constitutionally complete' consent
from the legislature to bring his tort cause of action against the state in its courts.
Id.
25. See Vanderpool,672 P.2d at 1156.
26. See id.

27. See id. at 1156-57.
28. Id. at 1157.
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further deference to the legislature, the court expressly stated that except for the
case at bar, its opinion would not become effective until October 1, 1985.29 The
court set the effective date of the opinion two years in the future to provide the
legislature enough time to consider the issue of sovereign immunity."
In 1984, in response to the Vanderpool decision, the Oklahoma legislature
codified its sovereign immunity policies through the enactment of the GTCA.3 In
the GTCA, the Oklahoma legislature adopted the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 2
In Turner v. Board of County Commissioners,33 the Oklahoma Court of Appeals
held that the GTCA is the exclusive remedy against a governmental entity within
the state.' The Turner court specifically abrogated any previously existing
common law or Statutory right of recovery for torts falling within the GTCA's
35
purview.
Under the GTCA, the state, its political subdivisions, and all their employees are
immune from tort liability for acts committed within the scope of their
employment.' The GTCA defines "scope of employment" as "performance by an
employee acting in good faith within the duties of his office or employment or of
tasks lawfully -assigned by a competent authority ...
With respect to faculty physicians, resident physicians, and interns, the following
are employees of the state who fall within the scope of the GTCA:
(1) physicians acting in an administrative capacity,
(2) resident physicians and resident interns participating in a graduate
medical education program of the University of Oklahoma Health
Sciences Center ....and
(3) faculty members and staff of the University of Oklahoma Health
Sciences Center ....while engaged in teaching duties.
Physician faculty members and staff of the University of Oklahoma
Health Sciences Center. . . not acting in an administrative capacity or
engaged in teaching duties are not employees or agents of the state.
However, in no event shall the state be held liable for the tortious
conduct of any physician, resident physician, or intern while practicing
medicine or providing medical treatment to patients?

29. See id. at 1153. This opinion was rendered on July 26, 1983.
30. See id. at 1157.
31. See Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, ch. 203, 431 Okla. Sess. Laws 1978 (codified as
amended at 51 OKLA. STAT. §§ 151-172 (1991 & Supp. 1995)).
32. See 51 OKLA. STAT. § 152.1(A) (1991).
33. 858 P.2d 1288 (Okla.Ct. App. 1993).
34. See id. at 1289.
35. See id
36. See 51 OKLA. STAT. § 152.1(A) (1991). This immunity applies irrespective of whether the state,
its political subdivisiors or its employees are performing proprietary or governmental functions. See id.
37. 51 OKLA. STIT. § 152(9) (Supp. 1995).
38. Id. § 152(5)(b).
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Moreover, the GTCA provides in pertinent part that "the State or a political
subdivision shall be liable for loss resulting from its torts or the torts of its
employees acting within the scope of their employment ... only where the state or
political subdivision, if a private person or entity, would be liable for money
damages under the laws of this State."39' Recently, in Anderson v. Eichner,4 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court clarified the issue of when faculty physicians, resident
physicians, and interns are "employees" of the state "acting within the scope of their
employment" under the GTCA. The court then determined when faculty physicians,
resident physicians, and interns are not provided immunity from tort liability under
the GTCA.
II. Anderson v. Eichner
A. Facts
In Anderson, the Oklahoma Supreme Court consolidated two separate actions for
disposition in a single opinion. The court joined these two actions to determine a
single issue of first impression in Oklahoma: Whether the Governmental Tort
Claims Act shields faculty physicians, resident physicians, and interns acting within
the scope of their employment as state employees from tort liability in medical
malpractice suits?
In the first action, the Anderson claim, a patient died from complications arising
from a surgical attempt to place a central venous line (CVL) into the patient's
jugular vein.4t During the surgery, the patient's lung and subclavian vessel were
punctured resulting in intrapulmonary and pleural hemorrhage.
Defendants in the Anderson claim included a resident intern, a resident physician,
and a faculty physician at the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center
(OUHSC).42 The resident intern and resident physician were participating in a
graduate medical education program at the OUHSC when they rendered medical
treatment to the patient. The faculty physician supervised and instructed the resident
intern and resident physician regarding the patient's treatment.
The representative of the patient's estate and next of kin brought a wrongful death
action for medical malpractice against defendant-physicians. Defendant-physicians
moved for summary judgment in the trial court. The trial court granted summary
judgment holding that defendant-physicians are immune from suit under the GTCA
because defendant-physicians were engaged in teaching duties or participating at the
OUHSC as students.

39. Id. § 153(A). A state or political subdivision is "subject to the limitations and exceptions
specified in this act . ... " Id.
40. 890 P.2d 1329 (Okla. 1994).
41. The CVL was needed to inject chemotherapeutic and antibiotic regiments into the patient. The
patient was being treated for leukemia. The patient's existing CVL began leaking and this surgery was
performed to replace it with a new CVL on his opposite side. See id. at 1333 n.2.
42. Plaintiffs also sued Oklahoma Memorial Hospital and the State of Oklahoma Teaching Hospital.
Plaintiffs' claims against these two entities were pending in trial court when this decision was rendered.
See id. at 1333 n.3.
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In the second action, the Bhat claim, the patient died from complications arising
from an elective vdvuloplasty to correct a narrowing of her heart's mitral valve.
During this procedure, the patient's heart was perforated, causing pericardial
bleeding which interfered with her heart's functions. This procedure was performed
by two faculty phys;icians and two resident physicians.
The patient's next of kin brought a medical malpractice action against defendants,
the individual physicians.43 Defendant-physicians moved for summary judgment.
The trial court granted summary judgment, holding that defendant-physicians were
immune from tort liability while engaged in teaching duties or while participating
in a graduate medical education program at the OUHSC.4
B. Holding
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Anderson held that although the state is
shielded from liability, the GTCA does not extend immunity from tort liability to
faculty physicians, resident physicians, "and interns engaged in the activities of
practicing medicine or providing treatment to patients. The Anderson court noted,
however, that faculty physicians engaged in teaching or administrative duties, as
well as resident physicians and interns participating in a graduate medical education
program, are immune from liability."
C. Reasoning
The Anderson court reasoned that the question of the physicians' immunity from
private tort liability turned on the construction of the GTCA.47 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Vanderpool v.
State." In Vanderpool, the court held that in the absence of a statute, the state,
political subdivisions, and their employees are liable in tort the same as a private
individual or corporation.49 In response to Vanderpool, the Oklahoma legislature
enacted the GTCA in 1984. In section 152.1(B) of the GTCA, the state's
immunity is waived "only to the extent and in the manner provided in" the
GTCA.5 Under section 152.1(A) of the GTCA, the state, its political subdivisions,
and all their employees are immune from private tort liability while acting within
the scope of their employment.' Section 153 of the GTCA extends governmental

43. Plaintiff also sued the State of Oklahoma Department of Human Services, Oklahoma Memorial
Hospital and the College of Medicine Private Practice Plan. Plaintiffs claims against these three entities
were pending in district court when this decision was rendered. See id. at 1334 n.8.
44. See id. at 1334. That is, physicians were state employees acting within the scope of their
employment under the GTCA. See 51 OKLA. STAT. § 152(5) (Supp. 1995).
45. See Anderson, 890 P.2d at 1341.
46. See iL
47. See id. at 1335.
48. See id.; Vanderpool v. State, 672 P.2d 1153, 1156-57 (Okla. 1983).
49. Anderson, 890 P.2d at 1335-36.
50. See i at 1336.
51. Id.
52. See id.
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liability to all torts for which a private person or entity would be liable subject to
specific "limitations and exceptions."'
In determining whether the physicians were immune from liability pursuant to the
GTCA, the Anderson court analyzed the definitional portion of the GTCA,
specifically section 152(5), in which an "employee" within the scope of the GTCA
is defined.' The language of section 152(5) distinguishes between two categories
of physicians: (a) teachers or students and (b) practitioners of medicine. 5
However, in Anderson, the physicians were engaged in activities that included
teaching or participating in an educational program and practicing medicine.'
These activities do not fit exactly within section 1 2(5)'s definitional scheme.'
Thus, the Anderson court sought to determine the legislative intent behind the
GTCA. The Anderson court opined that the legislature intended physicians to be
outside the scope of their employment while engaged in the practice of medicine,
even though at the same time they may be involved as a teacher or student.5 8 The
Anderson court noted that these physicians are protected by respondeat superior
liability for their acts that do not involve treating patients 9 Thus, pursuant to
section 153(A) of the GTCA, the state is not liable for the physicians' acts while
treating patients because "[tihe state . . . shall not be liable .. . for any act or
omission of an employee acting outside the scope of his employment."'
However, defendant-physicians urged that section 152(5) may limit the state's
liability but does not waive the physicians' individual immunity from private tort
liability.61 The Anderson court reasoned that the GTCA must be analyzed in its
entirety and must be interpreted to be reasonable and consistent as a whole. The
Anderson court rejected defendant-physicians argument after a review of other
sections of the GTCA. The Anderson court first discussed section 156(G) of the
GTCA, which requires that claims and suits against resident physicians or interns
must be made in accordance with title 12 (civil procedure) and title 76 (tort) of the
Oklahoma Statutes.' In addition, section 163 subjects resident physicians to private

53. Id. Section 153 provides:
A. The state or a political subdivision shall be liable for loss resulting from its torts or the
torts of its employees acting within the scope of their employment subject to the
limitations and exceptions specified in this act and only where the state or political
subdivision, if a private person or entity, would be liable for money damages under the
laws of this state. The state or a political subdivision shall not be liable under the
provisions of this act for any act or omission of an employee acting outside the scope of
his employment.
51 OKLA. STAT. § 153 (1991).
54. See Anderson, 890 P.2d at 1336; see also supra text accompanying note 38.
55. See supra text accompanying note 38.
56. See Anderson, 890 P.2d at 1337.

57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.

60.
61.
62.
63.

51 OKLA. STAT. § 153(A) (1991).
See Anderson, 890 P.2d at 1337.
See id, at 1338.
See id, Section 156(G) provides: "Claims and suits against resident physicians or interns shall
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tort liability despite their employee status." Section 154(D) limits resident
physicians' and interns' liability to $100,000.' The court reasoned that the
legislature included these provisions in the GTCA to protect student physicians in
the event they are s;ued for medical malpractice.' The Anderson court concluded
that because the legislature protected student physicians by enacting these
provisions, the legislature intended to subject faculty and student physicians
practicing medicine to individual tort liability."
Therefore, the Anderson court concluded that even though defendant-physicians
may have been acting as teachers or students when the tortious conduct occurred,
they were also engaged in practicing medicine.' When a patient is brought to a
clinical setting and the emphasis shifts to the treatment of illness, the physician is
outside the scope of protection provided by the GTCA.'
D. Dissenting Opinion in Anderson

In Anderson, similar to the majority opinion, the dissent focused their argument
on the interpretation of "employee" under the GTCA.7 The majority differentiated
between physicians as teachers and students versus physicians practicing medicine
or treating patients. In contrast, the dissent opined that for the purpose of imposing
liability, the distinction should lie between a physician treating a "state patient"
versus a physician treating a "private patient. ' 7' The dissent argued that because
the actions of the physicians in Anderson would not have been performed but for
their status as faculty physicians and students participating in an educational
program at the OUHSC, their, acts must be considered those of state employees
under the GTCA.
In other words, the state hires faculty physicians for the purpose of training young
physicians.' It is necessary for part of that training to take place in a clinical
setting where patients are treated 4 The Anderson dissent noted that "[t]eaching,
training and treatment go hand-in-hand and all are integral components of the
medical educational process."' The State of Oklahoma requires the faculty
physicians it employs to perform all these functions. 6 The dissent reasoned that
whether a faculty physician is teaching students, performing surgery, or treating the

be made in accordance with the provisions of Titles 12 and 76 of the Oklahoma Statutes." 51 OKLA.
STAT. § 156(G) (Supp. 1995).
64. See Anderson, E90 P.2d at 1338.

65. See id,
66. See id. at 1339.

67. See id.
68. See it. at 1341.

69. See id.
70. See id. (Watt, J., dissenting).
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id.at 1339 (Watt, J.,
dissenting).
See id.at 1341-42 (Watt, J.,
dissenting).
See id. (Watt, J.,
dissenting).
See id. at 1342 (Watt, J.,
dissenting).
Id. (Watt, J.,
difsenting).
See it. (Watt, J.,
dissenting).
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state's patients, the physician remains a teacher.' The state pays this physician to
perform these tasks, and the physician would not do these tasks but for his state
salary." Therefore, the dissent concluded that those activities should not be
considered "practicing medicine or providing medical treatment to patients" pursuant
to section 152(5).'
However, a faculty physician at a teaching hospital who is treating a private
patient usually receives compensation directly from the patient." The physician
does not receive payment from the state, as in the case of a state patient."
Irrespective of his affiliation with the state, a faculty physician's treatment of private
patients is "practicing medicine or providing treatment to patients" within section
152(5).' Even though a faculty physician may be engaged in teaching activities
while treating a private patient, fiis
reason for initially treating the patient was that
the patient retained him, not that he was employed as a teacher by the state.83
In addition, this analysis of a faculty physician is applicable to resident physicians
and interns participating in an educational program." The state requires residents
and interns to treat state patients as part of their scholastic responsibilities.'
Residents and interns only engage in treating these patients because the state
employs them to do so." Thus, the residents' and interns' activities while treating
the state's patients should be considered a portion of their educational process and
not the practice of medicine pursuant to section 152(5)Y
Therefore, the dissent in Anderson agreed with the trial courts that granted
summary judgment to defendant-physicians.' The physicians in Anderson were
engaged in either teaching or participating in an educational program as well as
practicing medicine; however, they would not have done so but for their status as
state employees.' Thus, pursuant to section 152(5), the physicians should be
shielded from private tort liability.'
In response to the dissent's argument, the majority in Anderson argued that the
plain language of the GTCA does not support the dissent's contentions. The
majority argued that if the legislature had intended to distinguish between medical
treatment rendered to a "state patient" and that given to a "private patient," it could
have explicitly done so.9'

77. See id. (Watt, J.,
dissenting).
78. See id. (Watt, J.,
dissenting).

79.
80.
81.
82.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See iU (Watt, J.,
dissenting).
See id. (Watt, J.,
dissenting).
See id. (Wyatt, J.,
dissenting).
See i (Watt, J.,
dissenting).
See id. (Watt, J.,
dissenting).
See id. (Watt, J.,
dissenting).
See id. (Watt, J.,
dissenting).
See id. (Watt, J.,
dissenting).
See id. (Watt, J.,
dissenting).
See id. (Watt, J.,
dissenting).
See id. (Watt, J.,
dissenting).
See id.
(Watt, J.,
dissenting).
See i.at 1339.
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The majority seems correct in that a plain reading of section 152(5) of the GTCA
suggests that if the legislature intended to differentiate between medical treatment
of "state" and "private" patients, it could have done so expressly. However, the
dissent suggests a better alternative to the determinati6n of liability under the GTCA
as it currently exists for five reasons. First, the dissenting opinion recognizes the
legitimate public interest of protecting faculty physicians, resident physicians, and
interns engaged in the treatment of "state patients" and of ensuring that these
physicians are properly trained. The state needs these physicians to treat its patients,
and these physicians need the state to provide a training facility.
Second, these physicians are paid a salary by the state for treating "state patients";
thus, they should be considered state employees. However, physicians should be
subject to tort liability for the negligent treatment of "private patients" because they
receive compensation from the patient. Third, as one of their job functions, the state
requires faculty physicians to not only teach young physicians but also to train them
to practice medicine. Similarly, resident physicians and interns treat state patients
as part of their academic responsibilities. Fourth, retaining immunity from private
tort liability for physicians will attract qualified persons into governmental service.
Finally, the dissent strikes a compromise between providing complete immunity
from liability to physicians and providing them no protection under the GTCA.
I1. The Federal Tort Claims Act's Treatment of Federally Employed Physicians
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides a limited waiver of the federal
government's sovereign immunity.' The FTCA subjects the federal government
to liability for the negligent acts of its employees but not its independent contractors.93 If a physician is an independent contractor, the plaintiffs remedy is to sue
the physician- individually rather than to sue the United States.' If a court
determines that a physician is a federal employee in a medical malpractice suit, the
United States is substituted as the defendant for the physician." Thus, the
government bears the costs of litigation and liability.'
In addition, a physician is immune from private tort liability if deemed a federal
employee.' However, whether the physician is a federal employee or an independent contractor, a judgment of medical malpractice will be placed in the physician's
file in the National Practitioner Data Bank." The physician is therefore subject to
some degree of professional accountability, even though the physician bears no

92. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1994).
-93. See id. §§ 1345(b), 2671.
94. See Thomas K. Kruppstadt, Determining Whether a Physician Is a United States Employee or
an Independent Contractorin a Medical MalpracticeAction Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 47

BAYLOR L. Rav. 223, 224 (1995).
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (1994).
96. See id. § 2679(c), (d)(1).
97. See Kruppstadt, supra note 94, at 225.
98. See id. Hospitals are required to request a search of the National Practitioner Data Bank
whenever they offer a doctor hospital privileges. See 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (1994).
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monetary responsibility.' In 1988, Congress amended the FTCA, adopting the
Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act in which a suit
against the government under the FTCA was deemed the exclusive tort remedy for
plaintiffs injured by government employees acting within the scope of their
employment."m
A plaintiff will generally prefer to assert that a physician is a federal employee
for several reasons. First, if the physician is a federal employee and the United
States is substituted as the defendant, then the plaintiff has found a deep pocket for
the payment of damages.'
In other words, a plaintiff is not limited by the
physician's assets and malpractice insurance limits."m Second and interrelated, a
plaintiff is more likely to collect on a judgment rendered against the United States
than from a private physician."
These reasons justify retaining immunity from private tort liability for physicians
employed by the state while treating "state patients" and subjecting the state to
liability for these physicians' acts without regard to whether they were acting as a
teacher, student, or a practitioner of medicine. Further, a plaintiff may find it easier
to collect from the state than from a private physician, and the state is better able
to bear the cost. In addition, the state has an interest in ensuring quality medical
care. A stable and efficient medical service system will sustain a healthy population,
therefore decreasing the demand on social welfare agencies."
IV. Implications of Anderson v. Eichner
Resident physicians are physicians in transition."
These physicians have
graduated from medical school and have learned the basic skills to practice
medicine; however, they still have much to learn." In addition, although most
physicians receive their M.D. degree at the end of medical school, the majority of
states require at least one year of clinical training."°
A significant problem with the Anderson court's decision to subject resident
physicians and interns engaged in practicing medicine to private tort liability is that
residents and interns have little liability insurance and few assets." Under
Oklahoma's GTCA, a resident physician's and intern's tort liability is limited to

99. See Kruppstadt, supra note 94, at 225.
100. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694,
§ 5, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (1994)); H.R. REP. No. 100700, at 2 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5945-46.
101. See Kruppstadt, supra note 94, at 225.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See Terri Skladany, Physician immunity Under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act: A Test
Without Direction, 10 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 5, 35 (1988).
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$100,000." However, this limit may fail to satisfy the tort principle of compensation in serious medical malpractice cases.11 In other words, because recovery
is statutorily limited, those plaintiffs who would otherwise obtain a judgment in
excess of $100,00D are not adequately compensated."' As a result, a plaintiff may
seek a deeper pocket to bear the liability.'
Thus, a plaintiff may attempt to recover vicariously from faculty physicians or
the hospital. In most instances, a medical school is affiliated with a public hospital
as in the Anderson case."' Medical schools need a public hospital's medical
facilities to educate their medical students, and public hospitals need the faculty of
medical schools to educate and train their residents."" Without these educational
programs, public hospitals would have a difficult time finding sufficient physicians
to treat their patients."5
Pursuant to Oklahoma's GTCA, the Anderson court concluded that the state is
immune from liability for the tortious acts of its resident physicians, faculty
physicians, and interns engaged in the practice of medicine."' Therefore, a faculty
physician is left a.; the only available vicarious defendant when a plaintiff sues a
resident or an intern.'" Under Oklahoma's GTCA, no statutory limit to recovery
exists to limit a faculty physician's liability. Because under certain theories of
liability a private hospital may be liable for the acts of its staff physicians, this
effectively places the faculty physician's insurer in greater jeopardy than a private
practice physician's insurer."' In addition, this may increase the faculty physician's
practice of defensive medicine and convey an improper message to resident
physicians and medical students." 9 This practice will likely result in an increase
in medical malpractice insurance.
Determining the appropriate standard of care for resident physicians in
malpractice suits is another important consideration. Residents have few assets from
which they can compensate injured patients. Thus, most injured patients seek
recovery through tfe legal doctrine of respondeat superior, which is premised on the
theory that the master should answer for the torts of the servant. However, the
servant must be negligent before the master is liable for his actions.
If the standard is too high, then faculty physicians and medical schools will be
held vicariously liable, for which the resident physician should be held accountable."2 If the standard is too low, the plaintiff will not be adequately compensat-
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ed." The crucial questions are: Should residents be held to the standard of care
of a specialist even though they are not completely trained? Should they be held to
the standards of a general practitioner even though they may have specialty training
well in excess of a generalist?'"
Resident physicians are in residency for three to seven years. During this period,
their responsibilities, training, and experience improve. Most courts have held firstyear residents to a general practitioner's standard of care." However, most courts
have not addressed the issue of the standard of care to which residents should be
held after their first year. The majority who have examined the issue impose a
specialist's standard of care."
However, residents should be held to a progressively higher standard of care as
their knowledge, experience, and training advance."z First-year residents should
be held to a generalist's standard, and residents in their final year should be held to
a specialist's standard of care."z Residents in the middle of their training should
be held to a standard in between a generalist and a specialist." Placing too great
a standard of care on resident physicians will result in holding hospitals and faculty
physicians unjustly accountable. However, imposing too low a standard of care may
leave plaintiffs without adequate compensation for their injuries.
V. UnderstandingAnderson in Light of Strubhartv. Perry Memorial Hospital
Trust Authority"s
The Oklahoma Supreme Court rendered its decision in Anderson several months
prior to its decision in Strubhart. In Anderson, the court noted that resident
physicians, faculty physicians, and interns remain within the purview of respondeat
superior liability for their activities that do not involve practicing medicine." The
Anderson court opined that the language of section 152 of Oklahoma's GTCA,
providing that the state is not liable for medical malpractice, indicates that the
legislature attempted to maintain the same protection that is afforded private
hospitals in similar situations."3 Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an
employer is generally held liable for those acts of an employee that fall within the
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employer's authority. 13' However, the Anderson court noted that in most jurisdictions, the theory of respondeat superior is not extended to subject a hospital to
liability for the tortious acts of a staff physician because the physician is usually
considered an indelendent contractor operating on his own behalf.'32 Thus, private
hospitals are generally free from liability for the tortious acts of their staff
physicians.
However, as a re;ult of Strubhart, private hospitals are now subject to increased
liability for the negligent acts of their physicians. The court's decision in Strubhart
extended a private hospital's potential liability beyond respondeat superior by
adopting the doctrine of independent hospital corporate negligence.' The court
imposed an independent and direct duty of ordinary care upon hospitals to ensure
that an incompetent physician has not been granted staff privileges."3' This duty
requires the hospital to take some reasonable steps to ensure that action is taken to
protect patients.'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has never answered the question of whether under
the current version of the GTCA the doctrine of independent hospital corporate
negligence applies to state hospitals as well as to private hospitals. However, in
Nelson v. Pollay," the Oklahoma Supreme Court did address this issue under the
1985 version of the GTCA.37 In Nelson, a patient brought a medical malpractice
action against a strtte-owned hospital and faculty physician, alleging negligent
medical treatment. The Nelson court held that the standards of liability which
govern private hospitals extend to a state hospital that is liable under the 1985
version of the GTCA in tort for a negligence of nonemployee physicians who
provided health care services at the hospital.
Thus, the Nelson court noted that under Strubhart, a private hospital owes an
independent duty directly to its patients to exercise ordinary care in extending and
supervising medical staff privileges of physicians.'38 The Nelson court opined that
although faculty physicians practicing medicine are not state employees, "their
'nonemployee' status does not relieve a state hospital of its responsibility properly
' 39
to credential medical-staff physicians.'
Although the Nelson court rendered its decision based on the 1985 version of the
GTCA, its analysis is likely applicable to the current version of the GTCA. If so,
state hospitals and Oklahoma teaching hospitals (collectively, the State Hospitals)
may be held liable for the negligent supervision and extension of staff privileges to
physicians who commit tortious acts while practicing medicine, even though the
State Hospitals are not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the
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physician's tortious acts. However, the State Hospitals have a persuasive argument
that the following language, which was not included in the 1985 version of the
GTCA, indicates a contrary intent of the legislature: "[I-n no event shall the state
be held liable for the tortious conduct of any physician, resident physician or intern
while practicing medicine or providing medical treatment to patients.""
When the Oklahoma Supreme Court finally determines the issue, the court should
hold the State Hospitals accountable for failing to properly credential medical staff
physicians. The State Hospitals should not be shielded from tort liability because
the justifications for imposing the doctrine of independent corporate negligence are
equally applicable to state and private hospitals.
The primary justification for adopting the corporate liability doctrine is to
increase a hospital's liability based on the modem hospital's changing role.'
Today, hospitals are large, profit-making corporations, which offer extensive
medical services within a corporate framework."" A patient "expects that the
hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on
their own responsibility."'43 Patients believe the physicians are caring for them on
the hospital's behalf.'" Therefore, the public's increased reliance on hospitals
justifies adoption of corporate liability.'45 It is inequitable for private hospitals,
faculty physicians, resident physicians, and interns to face increasing liability while
state hospitals hide under the cloak of sovereign immunity.
Conclusion
The recent Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in Anderson v. Eichne'"
determined that faculty physicians, resident physicians, and interns practicing
medicine are not immune from private tort liability.'47 The dissenting opinion in
Anderson presents a persuasive argument that faculty physicians, resident
physicians, and interns should be immune from liability while treating "state"
patients because these physicians are compensated by the state and would not treat
these patients but for their status as employees of the state.'" In addition, the State
of Oklahoma requires the faculty physicians it employs to perform the functions of
teaching, training, and treatment.'49 The faculty physician remains a teacher, even
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though he is performing surgery or treating the state's patients. t Thus, these
physicians treating state patients should be deemed employees of the state and
therefore immune from liability. This analysis is equally applicable to resident
interns participating in an educational program. Resident physicians and interns treat
state patients as part of their scholastic responsibilities. Thus, resident physicians
and interns should also be immune from liability for the treatment of state patients.
In contrast, these physicians should not receive protection from liability for their
treatment of "private" patients because the physician generally is compensated by
the patient.'
Finally, it is unfair to subject private hospitals and not state hospitals to increased
liability for their staff physicians through the adoption of the doctrine of independent hospital corporate liability. The justifications for imposing the doctrine of
corporate liability are applicable to state and private hospitals. Strubhart should be
extended to subject state hospitals to this doctrine. Thus, state hospitals as well as
private hospitals should be held accountable for negligent supervision and extension
of staff privileges to faculty physicians, resident physicians, and interns, even
though these physicians may also be practicing medicine.
Christa L. Britton
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